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Abstract  
This paper seeks to map and find structural and functional similarities between Seyla 
Benhabib's universalist model of Deliberative Democracy as propounded in her book 
'Claims of Culture' and the current polity in Pakistan's north-western province, 
Baluchistan. It also presents pathways and policy frameworks that can facilitate the 
application of Benhabib's prescriptions in Baluchistan to form a peaceful, inclusive and 
democratic regime in the province. 
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Introduction 
The social construction of Baluchistan through narrativization and media 
representation of its tribulations is that of a province composed of barren and arid 
landscapes, a shrinking economy and radicalized individuals lynching eachother in the 
name of religion, politics and contested ethnicities. Baluchistan is Pakistan‘s largest 
province by area and smallest by population. It is located in the South-West of the country 
bordering Iran and Afghanistan. "The ethnic composition of the province is mixed, with 
45% Baloch, about 38% Pashtun, and 17% of the population composed of other ethnic 
groups."1 The geographical borders separating it territorially from Iran and Afghanistan 
do not correspond to its ethnic borders and despite minimal cross-border interaction and 
mobility, the Baloch ethnicity, which is the dominant ethnic group in the region, 
encompasses certain geographical areas of Iran and Afghanistan. This invites political and 
economic claims from these two countries over the abundant resources in Baluchistan, 
making an ethnically complex and contested society, economically contested and thus, 
more unviable. 
 Baluchistan is rich in oil, natural gas, mineral and copper reserves and is home to 
Pakistan’s largest seaport ‘Gwadar’, which is a work-in-progress- a project of the Pakistan 
government to be completed in collaboration with its Chinese counterpart. The province 
is also one of the central and most strategic sites expected to host the Pakistan’s flagship 
infrastructure and ;and-based commerce project, the ‘China-Pak Economic Corridor’ that 
is expected to connect Kashgar in China to Gwadar in Baluchistan through a web of road 
and rail networks enabling China’s access to the Arabia Sea, Middle East and Central Asia.  
Despite its economic potential, Baluchistan is the most underdeveloped of 
Pakistan‘s five provinces with its current economic and health indicators presenting a 
worrisome state. The government of Pakistan relies heavily on Baluchistan for its energy 
and mineral requirements and peace in the province is central to its politico-economic 
interests in the region. But with ethno-nationalism and anti-federalist sentiments 
running high in the region, those interests are highly endangered.  
 A multitude of  interacting factors have contributed to the perpetuating ethnic 
conflict in Baluchistan that has ranged from being an ideological difference between the 
Baloch nationals and the Pakistan’s federal government to an armed conflict that has the 
potential of transforming into a deadly civil war. “The presence of large amounts of 
mineral resources and the construction of a new deep sea port at Gwadar have led to the 
possibility of billions of dollars of economic rent that will largely accrue to the local rulers 
and the educated middle classes in the militant tribes if they are able to secede or at least 
acquire greater autonomy from Pakistan.  
Even though mineral extraction requires huge investments by the multinational 
companies, the local perception is that an independent state will be able to benefit fully 
from the resource extraction. The greed element is therefore apparent and strong in this 
case and is playing an active role in shaping the politics of the era in the province. A 
detailed analysis of the grievance aspect of the conflict, however, indicates that there are 
serious flaws with the structure of governance in the area. An ongoing plunder of 
Baluchistan’s natural resources and its economic and political marginalization and 
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oppression through militarization are the major causes of mounting tension between the 
Baloch population and the government of Pakistan.”2 
 The armed conflict, as is feared by the government, could also transform into the 
next separatist movement in Pakistan - a country that lost its eastern wing to a similar 
movement in 1971 that culminated into the formation of a sovereign and independent 
state of Bangladesh. While politico-economic interests occupy the central place in 
explaining Pakistan government’s motivation to curb ethnic consciousness in 
Baluchistan, much of it could also be explained by fears that exist in relation to the 
historical context of postcolonial failures in Pakistan, especially the Bangladesh fiasco.  
 Aslam (2011) identifies the Baloch system of government as being dominated by 
tribal chiefs called Sardars locally. The Sardars have a continued antagonistic relationship 
with the Pakistan government operating from the country’s capital Islamabad in the 
Centre-North. Much of the current state of relations between the feudalistic Sardars and 
the democratic regime in Pakistan is explained through studies that recognize Baluchistan 
as a province with abundant natural resources and immense politico-economic potential. 
Ownership of these resources is a major cause of rift between the Baloch and other ethnic 
constituents. The situation has exacerbated through exploitation and evocation of ethnic 
sentiments by Sardars who are demanding greater ownership over local resources to 
sustain their political and economic sovereignty over the region.  
As Nasreen Akhtar (2011) points out that “ever since when an elected government 
sent armed forces to curb ethno-nationalism, Baluchistan has become an area of conflict 
and remains one today.”3 The ethnic groups have not been integrated into the national 
power structure nor been granted any measure of cultural and political autonomy have 
now turned against the Pakistani state. She believes that if the genuinely felt demands of 
the Baloch people for local autonomy and control over resources not met, there is danger 
of a civil war. ‘The history of ethno-nationalism in post-colonial Baluchistan, with its 
proliferating fractionalism and tensions between ethnic particularism and coalition 
politics, is not unlike the politics in other Pakistani provinces during this period. But they 
are distinctively inflected by Baluchistan long history as a tribal borderland, internally 
differentiated by unstable alliances based on personal rule rather than boundaries set and 
defended by a state.”4  
Ethno-nationalism, as it exists in the province manifests itself in ethnic violence 
and demonstrations against the state which is differentiated from meta-nationalistic 
narratives used by the government of Pakistan to create a socially cohesive, multi-ethnic 
and multi-cultural society.  
Theoretical Framework  
The argument that I defend in this paper pertains to the validity and applicability 
of Benhabib’s model in Baluchistan. Ethnic violence and impermeability of Baloch culture 
is narrativized through media representations which reinforce the notions of identity loss 
in peoples that situate themselves as ethnic Balochis. These media representations 
sometimes interlock with sporadic occurrences of voices that emanate from the province 
on how injustice and unfair democratic regimes have created indignations against the 
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national government. However, female and local perspectives in general have been absent 
from media representations and discourses that involve public reason and are of mutual 
interest to people in a democratic system.  
 The under-representation of Balochis in media which is seen as being a 
representative of the unofficial public sphere is used as reason to necessitate the 
application of a dual-track deliberative model that prescribes inclusion of all those in 
public deliberation affected by decisions of such a deliberation. The absence of narratives 
and local perspectives being gendered, how Baloch ethnicity manifests itself in forming 
predominantly patriarchal and male-dominated societies and how non-state justice in the 
province creates and reinforces male domination and supports a patriarchal culture at the 
expense of women liberation are reasons that have inspired writing of this paper. While 
the paper recognizes these injustices as happening, I don’t endeavor to commit to any 
form of fact finding that validates the absence of these narratives nor I would indulge into 
possibility theoretical underpinnings of what possibly might have caused what rather I 
would use media underrepresentation as a confirmation that legal pluralist structures and 
other forms dominant forms of politics and government in the country underscores 
Baloch inclusion and within the Baloch culture, the non-inclusion of women in discourses 
presents the region as an ideal site for application of models that promote inclusion of all 
concerned in public discourses that are of mutual interest. 
 While narratives are contested and advanced by groups sharing ethnic and cultural 
particularities and those narratives are used in understanding the self and otherness as 
integral theoretical constituents of the social constructivist theory of Seyla Benhabib, 
narratives that pertain to peace, coexistence, equitability of economic policies and the 
concept of peace within gendered socio-political frameworks in Baluchistan are 
completely missing from the literature.  
The quantitative aspect of the missing links in the literature leads to an evidence 
of conjectural data pertaining to gender discriminations and how they relate to the overall 
maintenance of peace in the region as some of that interacts with thematic inquires of 
peace and how it is epistemologically defined and how it can be attained or maintained 
through multiculturalism or Benhabib’s legal pluralism in general- Or can legal pluralism 
that advocates, as in Baluchistan’s case, presence of non-state justice also ensure 
eradication of gender discriminations that are inherently antithetical to other premises of 
Benhabib’s model like voluntary self-ascription, freedom of association and exit and 
egalitarian reciprocity?  
I will be exploring them in more detail as I get to her model in later parts of this 
paper but for now, one can analyze by working just the meaning derived from the self-
explanatory terms by analyzing how they interact with non-state justice which stands on 
legal precedents that are rooted in gender biases, conservatism and regressive legal and 
economic infrastructures.  
Benhabib‘s Universalist Model of Deliberative Democracy 
In a world fraught with struggles over culture where culture is taken as a 
ubiquitous term for identity, Benhabib’s model of universalist deliberative democracy 
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builds a philosophically adequate concept of culture by assessing its fluidity, permeability, 
and international applicability.5 Her theory promotes “complex cultural dialogues’ 
through which claims of divergent cultures can be facilitated. This she achieves through a 
dual-track deliberative democracy approach: a spatial solution to cultural contestation 
where the space of dialogues and discourses that pertain to claims of culture is not only 
the official public sphere that constitutes the legislature, the judiciary and the political 
parties hut also the unofficial public sphere that hosts social movements and civil, 
cultural, religious, artistic and political association s of the unofficial public sphere. The 
official public sphere, as Benhabib proposes, should not be the only site for political 
contestation and of opinion and will formation rather the unofficial public sphere should 
also be incorporated in the model as a space for interlocking conversation and 
contestation amongst groups of varying cultures.6  
 Although, as Benhabib prescribes, the agenda for such discourses in the public 
sphere is unrestricted as it encourages inclusion of diverse issues that can be of interest 
to all cultural, religious, political and social groups, Benhabib’s primary emphasis for 
having social movements in the unofficial sphere as basis for her deliberative democracy 
model is because they can be instrumental in upholding equality and justice- two rights 
that she frequents in her model as basis for maintenance of a peacefully coexisting, 
multicultural society. “Democratic theorists should support movements for equality and 
justice and for increasing the space for narrative self-determination in cultural terms.”7  
 “As globalization and the cultural pluralization of societies proceed apace, 
arguments are advanced for a legal pluralism that would countenance a coexistence of 
jurisdictional systems for different cultural and religious traditions and accept varieties 
of institutional design for societies with strong ethnic, cultural and linguistic cleavages.”8 
With Baloch Jirga the prevalent form of judicial system in Baluchistan, the status-quo 
system is based on Seyla Benhabib’s rational justification for legal pluralism. The 
presence of state justice which is engendered by the precedents set by the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan and local courts in the province, non-state justice as in other 
mainstream provinces of Pakistan becomes undesirable. However, as Benhabib’s model 
proposes that to resolve cultural conflicts where different cultures have different religious 
traditions and varying ethnic and cultural cleavages, a homogenous legal and 
jurisdictional system is theoretically inappropriate.  
Hence, one way in which Baluchistan’s current socio-political infrastructure 
qualifies Benhabib’s essential preconditions is that non-state justice (Jirga) is present to 
countenance state justice. Baluchistan’s legal pluralistic structure can provide for the 
more federalist members of the society that align their socio-political interests with the 
government of Pakistan while some non-state elements that are the source of current 
ethnic contestation in Baluchistan raising ethno-nationalist slogans against the 
government to achieve greater control over local resources, are seen to observe legal 
principles that abide by the precedents upheld by the non-state justice institutions like 
the tribal Jirga itself.  
 In defining culture, Benhabib’s focus is on culture being fluid and permeable rather 
than a closed, delineable whole. Her analysis that participants within a culture view it 
through traditions and rituals which are perpetuated through contested narrativization 
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of events is contrasted with her conceptualization of a social observer who is an outsider 
viewing the culture as a unified whole. The Baloch culture, which is perhaps one of the 
most authentic cultures in Pakistan, reaches the policy makers, whose participation is to 
the extent of being social observers in Baluchistan’s case since Baloch leadership has 
minimal participation in national discourses that involve public reason and opinion 
formation does not allow them to view Baloch traditions and cultures that Balochis 
themselves, as insiders, would view. This dichotomy presents a case for the conflict and 
non-cooperation of the Balochis who see imposition of non-Baloch leadership and 
assimilationist policies of the federal government as unfair and undemocratic. 
  “Domain of public reason must not be restricted to constitutional essentials, and 
that the ‘background culture’ which surrounds and infuses the task of reason with 
particular content, must be considered essential to consensus formation in liberal 
democracies.”9 One concern with regards to formation of a democratic polity in 
Baluchistan is whether policies that combat ethno-nationalism in the province, 
circumscribe separatist sentiments and aid the establishment of a harmonizing 
democratic regime must accept varying ethnic belongings of individuals. Those 
belongings cannot be understood without understanding public reasons advanced in 
discourses by groups as independent of their background culture. Policies that place 
ethnic and cultural groups as independent of their background culture are destined to 
invite backlash and resentment from people affected by such policies since they are 
exclusive and prioritize particular cultures over others.  
Is a multi-ethnic society necessarily multicultural?  
How can Benhabib's multiculturalist aspirations be fulfilled in a political site that 
is multi-ethnic but not explicitly identified as multi-cultural? In Baluchistan’s context, the 
terms are often used interchangeably and the Baloch culture is assumed to correspond 
spatially and ideologically to Baloch ethnicity. The notion of ethnicities and cultures being 
dissimilar ethnographic concepts necessitates defining ethnicities in a manner that also 
signifies how remotely the conceptualization of an ethnic group is different from that of a 
distinct and identifiable cultural group.  
Fredrik Barth’s definition of an ethnic group and his referential usage of culture to 
understand ethnic groups justifies application of  Benhabib’s model that is universalist 
and multiculturalist in nature and thus can commensurate a society marred with ethnic 
wars and competing claims of culture. Barth uses the term "Ethnic group to designate a 
population which: is largely biologically self-perpetuating, shares fundamental cultural 
values realized in overt unity in cultural forms, makes up a field of communication and 
interaction has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as 
constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order."10 
Validating the surmised interchangeability of the terms, Barth observes that "Ethnic 
distinctions do not depend on absence of social interaction. Cultural differences persist 
despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence."11  
In conjunction with Benhabib, Barth’s definition of ethnicities depend on 
formalistic and individualistic interactions within groups that are not bounded and are 
forming and reforming through interaction and enrollment of individuals. The dismissal 
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of the over-arching delineable group structure and allowance for social interaction 
between groups that could validate or invalidate norms and customs within groups are 
ethnographic processes that facilitate the interchangeability of the terms and also provide 
for intersection of Barth’s ethnic groups with Benhabib’s multiculturalist prescriptions. 
Like Benhabib prescribes migration between cultural groups as an individual choice in 
democratic societies, Barth believes that "Ethnic boundaries persist despite a flow of 
personnel across them. Categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on the absence of 
mobility, contact and information, but do not entail social processes of exclusion and 
incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation 
and membership in course of individual life histories."12  
Loss of identity due to Baloch population being only a small fraction of Pakistan’s 
total population is hindering the choice of individuals willing to enroll into other distinct 
ethnic categories and fears of losing the Baloch culture is impeding formation of a multi-
ethnic society where categories are maintained despite inter-ethnic social interaction and 
changing participation. Ideally, for application of Benhabib's model, "Pakistan is 
comprised of heterogeneous ethnic orders; in fact, the people of Pakistan form a complex 
“polygot” as Tahir Amin puts it, with migration from Central Asia, and Iran, plus the 
indigenous residents."13 By 1971, "there were six major ethnic groups: Baluch, Bengalis, 
Mohajirs, (Urdu speakers in Sindh who migrated from Northern India), Punjabis, 
Pashtuns, and Sindhis. The relationship between democracy and the multi-ethnic 
polarized society is interactive."14 since “the ethnic character of society influences the 
political ordering of the community, determines the rules of politics and shapes the 
general patterns of political behavior; democratic maturity mitigates ethnic tensions.”15 
Model Similarities between Benhabib's Prescriptions and Current Polity in 
Baluchistan 
Ethnic tensions that entail serious implications for peace and coexistence in the 
province yield economic, political and social platforms that can facilitate the interaction 
of the current state of polity in Baluchistan with Seyla Benhabib’s Universalist model of 
deliberative democracy. The model hinges on legal pluralism as a pre-requisite for 
forming a democratic society that upholds the three grounding principles of equality, 
freedom and justice. These three are necessary to operationalize her model as she 
considers the premises of egalitarian reciprocity, freedom of exit and association and 
voluntary ascription as being central to, and basis of any form of deliberative democracy 
and any public deliberation must precede the pre-conditions of freedom, justice and 
equality. 
 Baluchistan’s tribal Jirga which is a non-state and unregulated legal system put in 
place to provide impartial, localized and instant legal relief to the inhabitants of the 
province exists as a complementary legal system to the state justice rendered through 
local courts working under the supervision, direction and precedents set by the supreme 
court of Pakistan and the central legislature. Presence of legal pluralism in Baluchistan 
qualifies it as a test case for Seyla Benhabib's universalist model of deliberative democracy 
as legal pluralist structures continue to function despite existence and prevalence of 
narratives on how they are failing to provide the forms of relief deemed appropriate by 
modernist and post-modernist scholars in Pakistan and how the other premises of the 
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model that are based on the universal human rights that are essential to a democratic 
regime are compromised by presence of such a legal pluralist structure.  
 While the government is trying to bind the society through narratives of 
nationalism that are reified through anti-colonialism and historical warfare with 
neighboring rivals India, the Baloch nationalists are evoking ethno-nationalistic 
sentiments to propagate anti-federalism which is giving rise to ethnic tensions within the 
province. Lipset and Jalali writing on ethnic conflicts in a global perspective state post-
colonial ethnic tensions as occurring out of a colonial baggage of history. They use the 
term 'ethnic mobilization' to answer queries that address modernization as an era of 
philosophical and sociological inquiry to analyze if it has given rise to ethnic 
fragmentation and ethnic consciousness. Post-colonial power and politico-economic 
relationships they believe have engulfed regions of the world that presumed they had 
solved the nationality problem. The problems that ethnic diversity poses for nation-
building, they believe have largely been ignored by ex-communist and ex-colonial states 
of the world. 16 
 The Government of Pakistan is a recent entrant into the group of countries 
recognizing and solving the nation-building problem, its ethnic diversity is deep-rooted 
and has created unbreachable, artificial barriers to entry in Baluchistan as Punjabis are 
considered symbols of state power, inequality and economic exploitation and these power 
dynamics coupled with anti-federalist sentiments are instrumental in Balochis hindering 
the migration of people from other provinces to Baluchistan. Benhabib’s stance on more 
open borders and ethnic assimilationist strategies that facilitate coexistence of people 
with varying backgrounds, ethnic, cultural, religious and political identities is not an 
opinion shared by majority of the Balochis.  
Separatist Movements 
Since the loss of its Bengal province in 1971, Pakistan government is cautious of 
the likely happening of anything similar in the future. This merged with investigative 
reports that neighboring rival India is funding ethnic groups to mobilize Balochis against 
the Pakistan federal government in demands for a separate state has made a case for the 
application of Benhabib's Universalist model deliberative democracy. Benhabib's 
multiculturalist society where the principles of egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-
ascription and freedom of exit and association are upheld and respected upon by all 
citizens cannot be realized until people belonging to varying ethnic and cultural groups 
resolve to coexist and stay under one over-arching regulatory structure. That structure 
however can be based on pluralist legal and social regulatory regimes as is currently the 
case in Baluchistan where a pluralist legal structure is in place. 
 Although Benhabib doesn't dismiss the likely happening and justifiability of 
separatist movements on the pretext of ethnic and cultural contestation and breach of 
legal and social rights from a central government, and her observation on the matter 
allows for separatist movements but under the most distressed and undesirable 
circumstances since for her, they can’t guarantee instant and effective solutions to 
demands of varying ethnic and cultural groups that don’t consent to coexist. Her semi-
definitive dismissal of separatist tendencies is reflected in her following statement: 
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“From a political perspective, I don’t see the separatist movements offer a magical 
solution to the dilemmas of coexistence among different ethnic and cultural 
groups”17 
State and Non-State Justice 
The discussion on state and non-state justice needs to be begin by an estimation of 
the utility of a legal pluralist structure when non-state justice, which is unregulated and 
predominantly unofficial, violates basic tenets of human rights and a democratic political 
system? If the pluralist legal structure is inherently contradictory and the resulting 
dichotomization presents an internal downfall of the structure as different legal structures 
contest for power and patronization, then competition between legal structures, although 
assumed to be enabling for a just and fair society is questioned for its feasibility. "In rural 
spaces of many developing societies, there is an ideology of a shift from traditional non-
state justice to a justice of state prosecutors and courts. In practice, this often delivers a 
rule of law vacuum, or slow, corrupt justice that leads rural citizens to long for a return of 
traditional justice." However, "one response is for the state to not only to compete with 
insurgent justice by providing better access to less corrupt justice of its courts, but also by 
creating state-non-state hybridity that offers state protection to customary justice." This 
can be achieved if "hybridity between state and non-state justice can be designed to cover 
the human rights weaknesses of one with the strengths of the other."18 
 State-non-state justice hybridity is identified as an imperative in Benhabib’s model 
of Universalist deliberative democracy. The presence of traditional non-state justice 
qualifies the province to be a potential site for such a Universalist model of deliberative 
democracy if administrative issues identified by Gohar and Braithwaite are recognized 
and resolved. As cultural pluralization of societies is moving apace with globalization, 
Benhabib argues for legal pluralism that would support coexistence of different cultural 
and religious traditions and accept varieties of institutional designs for societies with 
strong ethnic, cultural and linguistic cleavages. 
Migration 
Linguistic differences and unacceptability of other ethnic groups in Baluchistan 
has created artificial barriers to entry in the province. Barriers to entry have serious 
implications for probabilities of creation of a multi-ethnic and multicultural polity that 
provides for practice of multiple political, religious and ethnic traditions in ways that form 
a complex maybe, but practically viable society. Language is an inseparable part of the 
Baloch ethnic formulation and is an essential constituent of the Baloch ethnicity. One of 
the most frequently used tests of identifying a non-Baloch in the region is a linguistic test 
that isolates non-native speakers of the Balochi language as outsiders, 'ethnic others' and 
socially unacceptable in the province. Although unstated in the official migratory 
regulations in the province, this supposed barrier for people wishing to migrate to the 
province has created a one-dimensional, uni-ethnic society in Baluchistan that is 
constantly at odds with Benhabib’s model that views migration as a choice for individuals 
and any barriers constraining such a choice as undemocratic, subjectivist and non-
universalist.  
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 "The closure of Baluch language newspapers and websites, lack of Baluch-language 
education and the opening of Islamic schools in a hitherto largely secular society have all 
added to the Baluch perception that they have been 'colonized' by Islamabad. This has 
had deadly consequences for innocent civilians caught in the middle. Although the main 
target of the insurgency has been the army, against whom resentment runs deep, Baluch 
nationalists have sought to force out Punjabi farmers and have killed scores of Punjabi 
teachers and students, viewing them as symbols of the Pakistani state, and hence 
Pakistani repression"19 
Media as the Unofficial Public Sphere 
When Aarushi Prakash discusses the state of journalism in Baluchistan with its 
post-congressional resolution and right to self-determination in place, she draws 
empirical evidence from the Pakistan media to support her thesis on the under-
representation of the Balochis. While social movements and political, religious, artistic 
and cultural associations are defined by Benhabib as components of the unofficial public 
sphere, one can also include forms of media to underpin whether discourses that involve 
public reason and opinion formation are inclusive and democratic.  
Pakistan’s media is burgeoning with an increasing tally of television channels and 
media houses. As this transition happens, any under-representation in media translates 
into a significant disadvantage for the province giving reason to anti-Pakistan voices and 
separatist movements. She writes that the “media is where brinkmanship in the divisive 
Baluchistan politics is played out between political parties competing for advantage and 
relevance. Baluchistan lacks access to factual and balanced news due to the huge 
geographical distances. A large part of the population is concentrated in cities such as 
Quetta, but is also spread out in remote areas with little access to electricity or information 
technology. In general, the media in Baluchistan is victimized in a complex ‘center versus 
periphery’ and ‘state versus ethnic group’ conflict.”20 
Conclusion 
The case of Baluchistan has unjustifiably been used as a testament to failure of 
democracy or downfall of democratic institutions in Pakistan. One of the purposes this 
paper serves is to clarify some of those misgivings that situate Baluchistan amongst 
ungovernable regions of the world. The thesis that I developed at the beginning of the 
paper about the viability of the province given its natural resource endowments and a 
strategically important geo-political position is strengthened through application of 
democratic principles in the province but ones with an increasing focus on public 
deliberation and the three principles of egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription 
and freedom of exit and association. The presence/absence of these three principles in 
the democratic context of Baluchistan makes a case for whether status quo democracy in 
Baluchistan is recipe for disaster where the four pathways to attainment of Benhabib’s 
model in Legal pluralist structure, open-migration in and out of the province are missing 
from policy objectives of the government as it strives to create a rather peaceful and 
harmonized coexisting society.  
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The existence of legal pluralist structures also distinguishes Baluchistan as a 
transitionary democratic site since it already hosts one imperative of Benhabib’s model 
considered vital to her prescribed transition from a commonly understood definition of 
an exclusive model of democracy to one with a stronger emphasis on public deliberation 
and inclusion of all concerned and interested.  
While pluralist legal structures exist, valid concerns remain on how those 
structures are maintained and if at all they end up substituting other tenets of egalitarian 
reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription and freedom of exit and association? These 
questions create new dimensions to the debate in the province that occurs over whether 
legal pluralist structures, specifically the traditional Baloch Jirga system should be 
preserved as a symbolic representation of impartial justice in the province and if the 
endgame of the Jirga system could be an endgame to multiculturalism in the province?  
 Benhabib's model thus provides lessons to the government on how 
multiculturalism and traditional tribal Jirga system, if regulated under guidance of three 
principles and pathways to her model of deliberative democracy, can provide basis for a 
transition toward a universalist model of deliberative democracy that shall guarantee 
peace and coexistence in the province without adding to local resentments and ethno-
nationalistic sentiments. Acknowledgement of varying ethnic and cultural cleavages and 
acceptability of migrant cultures can recede fears of a separatist movement on the part of 
government of Pakistan while the same would lessen loss of identity fears running high 
in the ethnic Baloch population-Any withdrawal of demands of a separate state from the 
Balochis would culminate into more equitable distribution of economic resources that can 
end resentment in the Baloch population which can then draw them into national 
discourses and deliberations that enhance acceptability of 'other' perspectives resulting 
in a more peaceful, multiculturalist democratic society.  
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